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I.		Facts	and	Context
In	January	2011,	‘Arab	spring’	popular	protests	erupted	in	Yemen,	calling	for	President	Ali	Abdullah	Saleh	to	resign.	By	November	2011,
President	Saleh	signed	the	GCC	Initiative	on	Yemen,	negotiated	under	the	auspices	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC),	the	UN,	and	the
European	Union	(EU),	effectively	stripping	him	of	power	and	instituting	a	long-term	political	transition	process. 	Vice-President	Hadi
temporarily	assumed	the	presidency,	in	anticipation	of	fresh	presidential	elections	on	21	February	2012,	which	he	won	as	the	sole	consensus
candidate. 	Additionally,	a	nationwide	Conference	for	National	Dialogue	(NDC)	was	instituted,	resulting	in	an	Outcome	Document	signed	by
all	political	parties	in	January	2014. 	The	transition	process	received	political	support	by	the	UN	Security	Council	(UNSC),	which	adopted
Resolution	2140	(2014),	envisioning	an	asset	freeze	and	travel	ban	for	individuals	‘engaging	in	or	providing	support	for	acts	that	threaten	the
peace,	security	or	stability	of	Yemen’. 	A	few	weeks	after	the	official	closure	of	the	NDC,	a	small	committee	decided	that	Yemen	would
become	a	six-region	federation.
Disturbed	by	the	prospect	of	a	six-region	federal	state,	and	‘unified	in	its	anti-corruption	and	anti-old	regime	posture’, 	Yemen’s	Houthi
movement	started	a	successful	campaign	of	territorial	conquest	from	their	northern	stronghold	of	Sada’a. 	This	religious/political	movement,
also	known	as	Ansar	Allah	(‘Partisans	of	God’),	has	its	origins	in	the	protection	of	Zaydi	traditions,	an	offshoot	of	Shi’a	Islam,	against	outside
encroachment	and	political	marginalization. 	It	had	long	been	suspected	of	having	close	ties	to	Iran,	which
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(p.	900)	stood	accused	of	(materially)	supporting	the	Houthi	rebellion. 	Led	by	the	Al-Houthi	family,	the	success	of	their	2014	uprising	was
due	to	a	‘coalition	of	convenience’	with	forces	loyal	to	former	President	Ali	Abdullah	Saleh.
In	late	July	2014,	the	group	capitalized	on	popular	outrage	in	the	wake	of	a	government	decision	to	cut	fuel	subsidies.	The	Houthis	set	up
camps	in	and	around	the	capital	of	Sana’a,	and	succeeded	in	establishing	full	control	over	it	by	late	September	2014. 	Early	2015,	President
Hadi	and	members	of	his	cabinet	were	put	under	house	arrest.	They	collectively	resigned,	followed	by	a	widely	denounced	Houthi
‘constitutional	declaration’	dissolving	Parliament	and	establishing	a	presidential	council	and	supreme	revolutionary	committee. 	However,
Hadi	succeeded	in	escaping	his	captors,	fled	to	the	southern	port	city	of	Aden	and	rescinded	his	resignation.	In	the	face	of	advancing	rebel
forces,	which	achieved	substantial	successes	against	government	forces	and	took	control	over	large	parts	of	the	country, 	he	requested
foreign	military	aid	from	the	GCC	on	24	March	2015. 	Immediately	hereafter,	he	fled	to	the	Saudi	capital	of	Riyadh.
On	26	March	2015,	Operation	‘Decisive	Storm’	was	launched,	designed	to	‘protect	the	people	of	Yemen	and	its	legitimate	government	from	a
takeover	by	the	Houthis’. 	It	was	led	by	Saudi	Arabia,	and	received	material	support	from	several	other	GCC	and	Arab	countries,	as	well	as
technical	and	logistical	support	from	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom. 	On	22	April	2015,	the	coalition	announced	that	the
objectives	of	‘Decisive	Storm’	had	been	achieved	and	it	would	move	to	the	next	phase	of	operations,	dubbed	Operation	‘Renewal	of	Hope’,
which	was	to	focus	more	on	the	political	and	humanitarian	process. 	This	second	phase,	however,	hardly	differed	from	the	previous	one,	in
that	bombardments	of	Houthi	strongholds	continued	largely	unabated,	but	did	lead	to	some	(small)	diplomatic	achievements.	For	example,	a
five-day	humanitarian	ceasefire,	(p.	901)	starting	on	12	May	2015,	was	agreed	upon,	but	collapsed	within	hours	of	its	expiration. 	Moreover,
consultations	were	held	in	Geneva	from	15	to	19	June	2015,	but	again	ended	without	agreement.
The	tide	in	the	Yemeni	civil	war	turned	with	the	coalition’s	launch	of	‘Operation	Golden	Arrow’	in	July	2015.	This	major	offensive,	including
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tanks	and	heavy	artillery,	quickly	succeeded	in	‘liberating’	the	major	city	of	Aden	and	the	Abyan	province	in	the	south,	and	in	retaking	control
over	the	strategically	important	al-Anad	military	base. 	In	all,	the	foreign	intervention	in	support	of	President	Hadi	clearly	tilted	the	balance	in
favour	of	the	government	forces	at	a	time	when	the	rebels	had	obtained	control	over	most	of	the	country’s	institutions.
II.		The	Positions	of	the	Main	Protagonists	and	the	Reaction	of	Third	States
and	International	Organizations
As	described	above,	President	Hadi	officially	requested	assistance	in	a	letter	to	the	GCC	on	24	March	2015.	In	this	letter,	he	accused	the
Houthi	militias	of	‘being	supported	by	regional	Powers	that	are	seeking	to	impose	their	control	over	the	country’,	implicitly	alluding	to	Iranian
support. 	The	letter	continued:
The	threat	is	therefore	not	only	to	the	security	of	Yemen,	but	also	to	that	of	the	entire	region	and	to	international	peace	and	security
…	The	Houthi	militias	have	committed	several	acts	of	aggression,	most	recently	deploying	military	columns	to	attack	and	take
control	of	Aden	and	the	rest	of	the	south	…	I	therefore	appeal	to	you,	and	to	the	allied	States	that	you	represent,	to	stand	by	the
Yemeni	people	as	you	have	always	done	and	come	to	the	country’s	aid.	I	urge	you,	in	accordance	with	the	right	of	self-defence	set
forth	in	Article	51	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	and	with	the	Charter	of	the	League	of	Arab	States	and	the	Treaty	on	Joint
Defence,	to	provide	immediate	support	in	every	form	and	take	the	necessary	measures,	including	military	intervention,	to	protect
Yemen	and	its	people	from	the	ongoing	Houthi	aggression,	repel	the	attack	that	is	expected	at	any	moment	on	Aden	and	the	other
cities	of	the	South,	and	help	Yemen	to	confront	Al-Qaida	and	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	the	Levant.
In	their	subsequent	letter	to	the	UN,	the	intervening	states	similarly	held	that	the	Houthi	militias	were	‘supported	by	regional	forces’	and	had
‘always	been	a	tool	of	outside	forces’,	therefore	establishing	a	‘threat	…	to	the	security,	stability	and	sovereignty	of	Yemen,	but	also	to	the
security	of	the	region	as	a	whole	and	to	international	peace	and	security’. 	Moreover:
the	acts	of	aggression	have	also	affected	Saudi	Arabia,	and	the	presence	of	heavy	weapons	and	short	and	long-range	missiles
beyond	the	control	of	the	legitimate	authorities	poses	a	grave	and	ongoing	threat	to	our	countries	…	They	recently	carried	out
large-scale	military	exercises	using	medium	and	heavy	weapons,	with	live	ammunition,	near	the	Saudi	Arabian	border.	The
Houthi	militias	have	already	carried	out	a	bare-faced	and	unjustified	attack	on	the	territory
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(p.	902)	of	Saudi	Arabia,	in	November	2009,	and	their	current	actions	make	it	clear	that	they	intend	to	do	so	again.
Consequently,	these	states	‘decided	to	respond	to	President	Hadi’s	appeal	to	protect	Yemen	and	its	great	people	from	the	aggression	of	the
Houthi	militias’. 	Whereas	the	statement	drew	attention	to	the	request	by	President	Hadi	‘for	immediate	support	in	every	form	and	for	the
necessary	action	to	be	taken	in	order	to	protect	Yemen	and	its	people	from	the	aggression	of	the	Houthi	militias’, 	subsequent	declarations
by	both	Yemen’s	Government-in-exile 	and	Saudi	Arabia 	explicitly	mentioned	the	right	to	collective	self-defence	as	a	legal	justification	for
Operation	‘Decisive	Storm’.
Third	states	and	international	organizations	in	large	part	lauded	or,	at	least,	acquiesced	in	the	military	intervention	on	Yemeni	territory.	In
particular,	the	League	of	Arab	States	‘fully	welcome[d]	and	support[ed]	the	military	operations	in	defence	of	legitimate	authority	in	Yemen	…
by	the	coalition	composed	of	the	States	members	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	and	a	number	of	Arab	States’	and	emphasized	that	the
operation	was	‘grounded	in	the	Arab	Treaty	of	Joint	Defense	and	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter’. 	This	support	was	echoed	by	various	western
states.	For	example,	the	United	States	recognized	that	the	action	was	taken	‘to	protect	Yemen’s	legitimate	government	…	at	the	request	of
Yemeni	President	…	Hadi’. 	It	then	promptly	announced	‘the	provision	of	logistical	and	intelligence	support	to	GCC-led	military
operations’. 	Similarly,	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	also	‘emphasised	the	[United	Kingdom]’s	firm	political	support	for	the	Saudi	action
in	Yemen’,	while	Ministry	of	Defence	officials	later	acknowledged	that	the	state	was	‘providing	technical	support,	precision-guided	weapons
and	exchanging	information	with	the	Saudi	Arabian	armed	forces’. 	Moreover,	France	stated	that	it	‘[stood]	alongside	its	partners	in	the
region	in	their	efforts	to	restore	Yemen’s	stability	and	unity’, 	while	Canada	also	endorsed	the	military	action.
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(p.	903)	Some	high-ranking	representatives	of	international	organizations	and	other	third	states	adopted	a	more	cautious	stance,	emphasizing
that	the	conflict	in	Yemen	could	not	be	resolved	militarily.	UN	Secretary-General	Ban	Ki-Moon	noted	that	‘negotiations	remain	the	only	option
for	ultimately	resolving	the	Yemeni	crisis’. 	Federica	Mogherini,	the	EU	High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs,	also	declared	that	‘military
action	is	not	a	solution’	and	that	‘[o]nly	a	broad	political	consensus	through	negotiations	can	provide	a	sustainable	solution’. 	China
expressed	the	hope	that	the	parties	would	‘resolve	the	current	crisis	through	political	dialogues’. 	Oman	was	the	only	GCC	member	state
that	refrained	from	participating	in	the	intervention,	since	this	would	preclude	the	state	from	‘work[ing]	on	peace	efforts’.
Outspoken	criticism	of	the	operation	was,	however,	noticeably	absent,	barring	few	exceptions.	Unsurprisingly,	Iran	accused	the	intervention
of	occurring	‘in	flagrant	defiance	of	…	international	law	…	in	particular	the	obligation	to	refrain	from	the	threat	or	use	of	force’, 	and
condemned	the	‘aggression	against	Yemen’	before	the	UNSC. 	Russia	called	upon	all	parties	to	‘immediately	cease	any	forms	of	warfare
and	give	up	attempts	to	achieve	their	goals	through	military	force’. 	It	later	declared	that	the	Saudi-led	operation	had	‘no	legal	foundation’.
More	cautiously,	the	Iraqi	President	stated	that	‘the	problem	of	Yemen	is	within	Yemen’. 	This	was	in	line	with	the	comments	made	by	its
Foreign	Minister,	who	claimed	that	‘bringing	external	forces	is	not	right’	as	it	was	the	position	of	Iraq	to	‘resort	to	…	non-interference	in
Yemen’s	internal	affairs’.
The	UNSC	issued	a	Presidential	Statement	mere	days	before	the	launch	of	Operation	Decisive	Storm,	in	which	it	called	on	‘all	Member
States	to	refrain	from	external	interference	which	seeks	to	foment	conflict	and	instability	[in	Yemen]’. 	However,	Resolution	2216	(2015),
adopted	weeks	after	the	start	of	operations,	expressly	noted	both	the	letter	of	President	Hadi	requesting	military	assistance	and	the	letter	from
intervening	states	in	response. 	Although	this	reference	cannot	be	read	as	an	authorization	ex	post	facto,	the	Council	clearly	did	not
denounce	the	intervention	either.	This	muted	reaction	was
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(p.	904)	furthermore	evident	from	the	ensuing	debate:	not	a	single	Council	member	explicitly	questioned	the	legality	of	Operation	‘Decisive
Storm’.
III.		Questions	of	Legality
In	spite	of	the	scope	and	intensity	of	the	operation,	academic	scrutiny	of	Operation	Decisive	Storm	was	surprisingly	scarce	and	mostly
confined	to	the	blogosphere. 	Most	blog	posts	quickly	discarded	the	self-defence	argument(s)	as	inapplicable	in	the	Yemen	case,	and
instead	focused	on	the	intervention	by	invitation	argument.	Each	of	the	possible	legal	bases	is	addressed	separately	below.
1.		Right	to	collective	self-defence	pursuant	to	armed	attack(s)	against	Yemen?
As	mentioned	above,	the	principal	intervening	states	expressly	invoked	the	right	to	collective	self-defence	against	the	‘Houthi	aggression’	to
justify	their	intervention. 	At	the	same	time,	given	that	the	armed	conflict	was	waged	by	Yemenis	against	Yemenis	prior	to	the	coalition’s
intervention,	commentators	found	it	difficult	to	see	how	the	incumbent	government	could	have	validly	requested	allied	nations	to	come	to	its
aid	militarily	under	the	framework	of	the	right	to	collective	self-defence.	Thus,	Deeks	regarded	the	reliance	on	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	as
‘odd’	and	‘misplaced’,	seeing	it	as	‘a	way	to	divert	blame	away	from	a	regime’s	own	internal	failures’. 	There	indeed	appeared	to	be	no
indications	(including	in	the	statements	of	the	intervening	states)	that	the	attacks	by	the	Houthi	rebels	emanated	from	abroad,	or	that	they	had
any	cross-border	features,	thus	casting	doubt	as	to	the	existence	of	an	‘armed	attack’	(which	presupposes	some	external	component).
Even	so,	the	question	remains	whether	the	required	external	component	could	be	derived	from	a	high	degree	of	third-state	involvement	in	the
attacks	carried	out	by	the	Houthi	rebels. 	This	hypothesis	refers	to	the	concept	of	‘indirect	military	aggression’,	as	envisaged	by	Article	3(g)
of	the	UN	General	Assembly	(UNGA)	Definition	of	Aggression. 	The	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ)	famously	used	this	provision	in	the
Nicaragua	case	as	the	basis	to	determine	the	permissibility	of	self-defence	in	a	proxy	warfare	context:
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(p.	905)
[A]n	armed	attack	must	be	understood	as	including	not	merely	action	by	regular	armed	forces	across	an	international	border,	but
also	‘the	sending	by	or	on	behalf	of	a	State	of	armed	bands,	groups,	irregulars	or	mercenaries,	which	carry	out	acts	of	armed	force
against	another	State	of	such	gravity	as	to	amount	to’	(inter	alia)	an	actual	armed	attack	conducted	by	regular	forces,	‘or	its
substantial	involvement	therein’.
While	the	Court	ostensibly	urged	a	restrictive	reading	of	the	concept	of	indirect	military	aggression	by	excluding	‘the	provision	of	weapons	or
logistical	or	other	support’, 	this	narrow	approach	was	subsequently	criticized	by	dissenting	Judges	Jennings	and	Schwebel, 	and	has
further	come	under	strain	in	post-Cold	War	practice.
Some	scholars	have	since	suggested	that	the	criterion	might	include	support	that	is	essential	in	the	group’s	ability	to	commit	(what	could	be
qualified	as)	an	armed	attack. 	Reference	is	sometimes	made	in	this	regard	to	the	‘overall	control’	test	as	laid	down	by	the	International
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	in	the	Tadić	case,	and	which	encompasses	that	‘a	State	has	a	role	in	organising,	coordinating	or
planning	the	military	actions	of	the	military	group,	in	addition	to	financing,	training	and	equipping	or	providing	operational	support’. 	While
this	test	was	primarily	developed	for	purposes	of	determining	whether	an	armed	conflict	should	be	regarded	as	‘international’	or	‘non-
international’	for	jus	in	bello	purposes, 	its	application	could	be	extended	to	the	field	of	the	jus	ad	bellum.	Put	differently:	a	state’s	overall
control	over	a	non-state	armed	group	potentially	internationalizes	a	non-international	armed	conflict,	and	might	thus	constitute	the	necessary
external	component	for	the	existence	of	an	armed	attack.
However,	even	if	one	accepts	such	broad	interpretation	of	the	concept	of	indirect	military	aggression,	it	remains	doubtful	whether	third-state
support	for	the	Houthi	campaign	was	sufficiently	substantial	to	‘externalize’	the	Houthi	attacks,	thus	triggering	the	right	of	self-defence.
Indeed,	even	leaving	aside	the	fact	that	the	third	state	(read:	Iran)	allegedly	providing	assistance	to	the	Houthi	rebels	was	not	even	mentioned
by	name	in	the	26	March	statement, 	as	well	as	the	fact	that	Iran	categorically	denied	any	and	all	accusations, 	it	must	be	observed	that
several	states	concerned	seemed	to	implicitly	acknowledge	that	Iran’s	alleged	involvement	did	not	meet	the	tentative	threshold	set	out	above.
For	example,	a	spokesperson	for	the	US	Department	of	State	admitted	‘not	[having]	seen	evidence	that	Iran	is	exerting	command	and	control
over	the	Houthis	activities’,	while	the	(then)	Saudi
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(p.	906)	ambassador	to	the	United	States	only	referred	to	‘reports	that	the	Iranians	are	providing	weapons	and	training	and	advisors	to	the
Houthis’. 	None	of	the	intervening	states	provided	evidence	that	Iran’s	involvement	went	any	further	than	this,	or,	at	least,	argued	as	such	on
the	international	plane.	It	follows	that	the	collective	self-defence	argument	is	not	(in	the	present	authors’	view)	persuasive.	Vermeer	arrives	at
the	same	conclusion:	‘the	Houthi	insurgency	cannot	be	conceptualised	as	an	external	armed	attack	on	Yemen’.
2.		Right	to	individual	and	collective	self-defence	pursuant	to	an	(imminent)	armed
attack	against	Saudi	Arabia?
A	second	justification	hinted	at	by	the	intervening	states,	was	the	right	to	individual	and	collective	self-defence	in	defence	of	Saudi	Arabia.
The	Houthi	uprising,	and,	in	particular,	the	‘presence	of	heavy	weapons	…	beyond	the	control	of	the	legitimate	authorities’	allegedly	posed	‘a
grave	and	ongoing	threat’	to	GCC	member	states. 	The	existence	of	such	a	threat	was	recognized	by	the	US	statement,	which	referred	to	the
need	to	‘defend	Saudi	Arabia’s	border’,	and	(indirectly)	by	Resolution	2216	(2015)	which	demanded	that	the	Houthis	‘refrain	from	any	…
threats	to	neighbouring	States,	including	through	…	stockpiling	weapons	in	any	bordering	territory’.
Acceptance	of	the	second	self-defence	argument	nonetheless	presupposes	two	things.	First,	it	assumes	an	acceptance	that	a	non-state
armed	group,	such	as	the	Houthi	rebels,	is	capable	of	mounting	an	‘armed	attack’	in	the	sense	of	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter,	triggering	the
right	of	self-defence,	of	its	own,	irrespective	of	any	state	involvement.	This	view	is	not	without	support	in	contemporary	state	practice 	or
legal	doctrine, 	albeit	that	the	permissibility	of	self-defence	against	attacks	by	non-state	actors	remains	the	subject	of	considerable
discussion.
Second,	inasmuch	as	no	claims	were	made	that	there	had	been	any	actual	Houthi	attacks	against	Saudi	Arabia	in	the	period	preceding	the
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launch	of	Operation	Decisive	Storm, 	the	validity	of	the	individual	self-defence	argument	is	premised	on	the	view	that	the	right	of	self-
defence	applies	not	only	in	the	case	of	actual	(past	or	ongoing)	armed	attacks,	but
References
(p.	907)	also	to	threats	of	attack.	The	permissibility	of	so-called	‘anticipatory’	self-defence	has	been	subject	to	debate	throughout	the	entire
Charter	era,	with	legal	doctrine	being	divided	between	those	pointing	to	the	texte	clair	of	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	and	others	pointing	at	an
allegedly	broader	right	of	self-defence	under	customary	international	law.
An	in-depth	analysis	of	this	debate	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	Suffice	it	to	note	that	in	the	post-9/11	era,	support	for	some	form	of
anticipatory	self-defence	has	increased,	both	in	legal	doctrine,	as	well	as	in	state	practice. 	At	the	same	time,	support	for	anticipatory	self-
defence	is	generally	construed	along	the	lines	of	the	famous	‘Caroline’	formula, 	which	presupposes	that	an	attack	is	‘imminent’. 	The
ostensible	attempt	in	the	2002	US	National	Security	Strategy 	to	broaden	the	exercise	of	self-defence	to	certain	‘non-imminent’	threats	was
broadly	rejected	by	states	and	scholars	alike 	(and	appears	to	have	subsequently	been	revoked	by	the	United	States ).
In	the	present	case	no	evidence	was	brought	forward	to	suggest	that	the	Houthis	were	planning	any	armed	attack	against	Saudi	Arabia,	let
alone	that	it	had	already	entered	the	implementation	phase	and	could	be	regarded	as	‘imminent’.	Instead,	the	coalition	merely	presented
indications	of	a	potentially	hostile	attitude,	that	is,	the	build-up	of	Houthi	military	presence	in	the	border	region,	or	presented	the	Houthi	coup	in
general	terms	‘as	a	threat	to	the	security	and	sovereignty	of	Yemen,	the	security	of	the	Gulf	and	international	peace	and	security’. 	It	follows
that,	even	if	one	accepts	that	attacks	by	non-state	armed	groups	can	of	themselves	qualify	as	‘armed	attacks’	triggering	the	right	of	self-
defence,	and	even	if	one	accepts	the	legality	of	anticipatory	self-defence	against	‘imminent’	attacks	(which	remains	controversial ),
Operation	Decisive	Storm	still	cannot	be	construed	as	a	proper	application	of	the	right	of	self-defence.	Vermeer	similarly	concludes	that	the
self-defence	claim	appears	‘weak’,	since	‘there	has	been	no	armed	attack	on	Saudi	Arabia	emanating	from	Yemen,	nor	is	one	imminent’.
3.		Intervention	by	invitation
A	final	(and	ostensibly	more	straightforward)	legal	argument	that	was	put	forward	to	justify	the	military	intervention	relied	upon	the	consent	by
President	Hadi	to	allow	the	use	of	force	by	foreign	states	on	Yemeni	territory.	This	was	also	treated	by	most	commentators
References
(p.	908)	as	the	principal	justification	for	Operation	Decisive	Storm 	(or	the	‘most	promising’	legal	justification,	as	one	author	put	it).
It	is	generally	accepted	that	valid	state	consent	to	the	use	of	force	on	its	territory	precludes	a	violation	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter.
Support	for	the	permissibility	of	so-called	‘intervention	by	invitation’	doctrine	can	be	found	in	Article	3(e)	of	the	UNGA	Definition	of
Aggression,	the	practice	of	the	UNSC,	ICJ	jurisprudence,	and	legal	doctrine. 	At	the	same	time,	this	‘legalizing	effect’	of	state	consent
depends	on	its	intrinsic	validity,	which	requires,	inter	alia,	that	consent	for	the	act	must	emanate	from	the	highest	authorities	of	the	state. 	In
situations	of	grave	internal	turmoil,	however,	it	can	be	unclear	whether	the	embattled	government	can	still	(claim	to)	represent	the	state	for
such	purposes.	Two,	interrelated,	criteria	are	generally	considered	decisive	in	that	regard. 	First,	the	consenting	entity	needs	to	exercise
effective	control	over	the	state’s	territory.	This	logically	excludes	intervention	by	invitation	in	a	situation	of	complete	state	failure	or
anarchy. 	Second,	the	entity	needs	to	enjoy	widespread	international	recognition.	The	position	adopted	by	international	organizations,	and
the	UN	in	particular,	is	often	regarded	as	holding	significant	probative	value	in	that	regard.
In	the	present	case,	it	was	clear	in	late	March	2015	that	the	Hadi	government	had	lost	effective	control	over	significant	parts	of	the	territory,
even	if	forces	loyal	to	the	exiled	government	continued	resisting	the	rebel	advance,	especially	in	the	south	and	east	of	the	country. 	Still,	it
must	be	recalled	that	international	law	traditionally	maintains	a	presumption	in	favour	of	the	established	government	‘so	long	as	the	civil	war,
whatever	its	prospects,	is	in	progress’. 	Furthermore,	it	has	been	observed	that	the	‘legitimacy	of	origin’	of	a	government	can,	to	some
extent,	‘offset	its	lack	of	effectiveness’. 	In	this	context,	it	is	clear	that	the	Hadi	government	retained	international	recognition	as	evidenced
by	Resolution	2216	(2015),	which	unequivocally	reaffirmed	‘its	support	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	President	of	Yemen,	Abdo	Rabbo	Mansour
Hadi’.
Writing	shortly	after	the	operation	was	launched,	Chesney	noted	that	‘[s]ome	might	quibble	with	the	authority	of	Hadi’	to	request	outside
intervention,	but	nonetheless	found	the	legal	basis	to	be	‘strong’. 	Deeks	for	her	part	found	that	the	consent	was	‘not	as	robust
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(p.	909)	as	it	would	be	if	[Hadi]	remained	in	power	in	Yemen’. 	At	the	same	time,	she	acknowledges	that	there	have	been	several	examples
of	military	intervention	in	past	decades	in	support	of	and	with	the	consent	of	leaders	who	had	lost	effective	control	over	their	countries,
suggesting	that	Operation	Decisive	Storm	is	‘just	another	example	to	add	to	the	pile’.
Leaving	aside	the	intrinsic	validity	of	Hadi’s	request,	a	second	factor	complicated	the	legality	of	the	intervention.	A	large	share	of	legal
doctrine	indeed	accepts	that	customary	international	law	prohibits	third-states	from	intervening	militarily	in	support	of	any	party	embroiled	in
a	civil	war, 	including	the	incumbent	regime.	This	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	‘negative	equality’	doctrine. 	According	to	this	view,	the
principle	of	non-intervention	and	the	right	to	self-determination	proscribe	such	assistance,	given	that	the	former	prohibits	‘interference	in	civil
strife	in	another	State’, 	whereas	the	latter	prescribes	that	‘[a]ll	peoples	have	the	right	[to]	freely	determine	their	political	status	and	freely
pursue	their	economic,	social	and	cultural	development’. 	The	underlying	idea	is	that	the	latter	right	is	enjoyed	by	‘peoples’	and	can
therefore	not	be	freely	disposed	of	by	government	consent.
A	second	school	of	thought,	however,	firmly	opposes	such	a	reading	of	international	law,	arguing	instead	that	it	remains	permissible	to
provide	foreign	military	aid	to	the	de	jure	authorities	(as	opposed	to	aiding	rebel	forces),	even	in	situations	of	civil	war.	First,	these	scholars
argue	that	this	approach	best	corresponds	to	‘traditional	international	law’. 	Second,	they	postulate	that	modern	state	practice	flatly
discredits	the	alleged	customary	prohibition	on	military	assistance	to	a	government	in	times	of	(civil)	war. 	Reference	in	this	regard	has
been	made	to	recent	interventions	in	Mali	(2013)	and	Iraq	(2014).
(p.	910)	If	this	latter	(‘government-preference’)	approach	is	followed,	the	Saudi-led	intervention	would	prima	facie	appear	lawful.	Conversely,
if	one	opts	for	the	‘negative	equality’	approach—which,	in	the	view	of	the	present	authors,	is	more	convincing—this	does	not	necessarily
imply	that	Operation	Decisive	Storm	was	unlawful.	Indeed,	even	proponents	of	the	‘negative	equality’	theory	widely	accept	that	the	assumed
prohibition	of	providing	pro-government	assistance	in	a	civil	war	no	longer	applies	in	case	of	prior	third-state	aid	to	rebel	forces.	The	concept
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of	‘counter-intervention’	stands	as	the	theory’s	best	established	exception,	though	possibly	also	the	most	abused. 	Importantly,	state
practice	suggests	that	in	order	to	justify	a	‘counter-intervention’,	the	prior	support	to	the	non-state	armed	group	need	not	rise	to	the	level	which
is	required	to	‘externalize’	an	armed	attack	in	the	context	of	indirect	military	aggression	(see	above). 	In	light	of	the	foregoing,	it	could	be
argued	that	the	alleged	Iranian	support	to	the	Houthi	rebels	would	effectively	justify	some	form	of	counter-intervention	in	support	of	the
recognized	Yemeni	Government.
In	the	present	authors’	view,	however,	the	foregoing	analysis	does	not	imply	that	Operation	Decisive	Storm	was	fully	compatible	with
international	law.	While	this	is	an	issue	which	has	received	little	attention	in	legal	doctrine, 	normatively,	a	strong	argument	can	indeed	be
made	that	any	‘counter-intervention’	should	be	subject	to	a	proportionality	test,	as	is	the	case	for	other	forms	of	self-help	such	as	self-defence
and	countermeasures.	In	the	present	case,	however,	the	coalition’s	pro-Hadi	assistance,	which	included	months-long	air	raids,	a	crippling	air
and	naval	blockade,	and	even	boots-on-the-ground,	undeniably	dwarfed	any	Iranian	involvement,	even	if	all	rumours	thereof	are	accepted	as
fact.	Accordingly,	the	Yemeni	people	were	arguably	not	allowed	to	freely	decide	their	(political)	future,	through	‘a	physical	contest	if
necessary’, 	inasmuch	as	the	intervention	did	not	aim	exclusively	at	cancelling	out	alleged	interference	by	Iran,	but	rather	sought	to	defeat
the	Houthi	rebel	movement	and	restore	Hadi	to	power.	On	balance	then,	even	if	one	accepts	that	the	Saudi-led	operation	constituted	a
‘counter-intervention’,	it	would	appear	manifestly	disproportionate	to	the	alleged	Iranian	aid	to	the	Houthi	rebels.	As	such,	the	Saudi-led
operation	could	not	be	justified	by	reliance	upon	any	of	the	established	exceptions	to	the	prohibition	of	the	use	of	force,	and	rather	constituted
a	(serious)	violation	of	the	jus	contra	bellum.
IV.		Conclusion:	Precedential	Value
The	Saudi-led	intervention	on	Yemeni	territory	met	with	approval	or,	at	least,	acquiescence	by	the	majority	of	states,	with	only	few
exceptions.
Although	the	intervening	states	expressly	referred	to	the	right	of	self-defence,	reliance	on	the	latter	legal	basis	seems	rather	‘odd’	and
‘misplaced’. 	Absent	any	in-depth	debate	of	the	self-defence	argument,	and	seeing	as	‘intervention	by	invitation’	would	seem	to	provide	a
more	straightforward	legal	basis,	it	is	submitted	that	little	can	be	drawn	from	the	Yemen	precedent	in	terms	of	the	interpretation	of	the	right	of
self-defence.	In	particular,	(p.	911)	the	Yemen	case	should	not	be	interpreted	as	precedent	in	support	of	a	broad	right	of	self-defence	against
non-imminent	threats	posed	by	non-state	actors	abroad.
As	far	as	the	request	by	President	Hadi	is	concerned,	it	is	recalled	that	it	was	made	at	a	time	when	his	government	had	lost	control	over
significant	parts	of	the	territory,	and	that	he	was	forced	to	flee	the	country	days	after	issuing	the	request.	In	spite	hereof,	it	appears	that	the
request	was	mostly	regarded	as	valid,	due	to	the	fact	that	Hadi	continued	to	enjoy	unequivocal	international	recognition	by	the	international
community.	This	leads	to	the	tentative	conclusion	that	such	widespread	international	recognition	can	ostensibly	compensate	for	substantial
loss	of	control	over	territory	for	the	purposes	of	remaining	the	state’s	sole,	legitimate	representative,	including	for	purposes	of	requesting
outside	military	support	(although	some	have—rightly—cautioned	that	this	introduces	an	element	of	subjectivity	in	the	legal	framework).
Furthermore,	having	regard	to	supportive/acquiescent	attitude	of	other	states	vis-à-vis	the	operation,	in	spite	of	its	taking	place	against	the
background	of	an	ongoing	civil	war,	some	will	be	tempted	to	conclude	that	this	precedent	offers	yet	more	evidence	that	the	‘negative	equality’
doctrine	is	not,	and	has	never	been,	supported	by	state	practice	and	opinio	juris.	However,	taking	into	account	the	alleged	Iranian
involvement,	the	better	view	seems	to	be	that	the	operation	constituted	an	example	of	that	doctrine’s	best	established	exception,	that	is,
‘counter-intervention’,	and	should	not	be	regarded	as	evidence	that	de	jure	authorities	can	lawfully	request	outside	military	support	in
situations	of	civil	war.
At	the	same	time,	having	regard	to	the	scope	and	intensity	of	the	Saudi-led	intervention,	the	Yemen	case	certainly	raises	the	question
whether	a	counter-intervention	is	subject	to	a	proportionality	test.	According	to	the	present	authors,	the	answer	must	be	affirmative	if	the
concept	of	counter-intervention	is	to	be	more	than	an	empty	shell.
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